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Abstract
Most existing techniques for spam detection on Twitter aim to identify and block users who post spam tweets. In this
paper, we propose a Semi-Supervised Spam Detection (S3D) framework for spam detection at tweet-level. The proposed
framework consists of two main modules: spam detection module operating in real-time mode, and model update
module operating in batch mode. The spam detection module consists of four light-weight detectors: (i) blacklisted
domain detector to label tweets containing blacklisted URLs, (ii) near-duplicate detector to label tweets that are near-
duplicates of confidently pre-labeled tweets, (iii) reliable ham detector to label tweets that are posted by trusted users and
that do not contain spammy words, and (iv) multi-classifier based detector labels the remaining tweets. The information
required by the detection module are updated in batch mode based on the tweets that are labeled in the previous time
window. Experiments on a large scale dataset show that the framework adaptively learns patterns of new spam activities
and maintain good accuracy for spam detection in a tweet stream.
1 Introduction
Micro-blogging services have attracted the attention of
not only legitimate users but also spammers. It is reported
that 0.13% of messages advertised on Twitter are clicked,
which is two orders of magnitude higher than that of email
spam [10]. High click-rate and effective message propa-
gation make Twitter an attractive platform for spammers.
Increasing spamming activities have adversely affect user
experience as well as many tasks such as user behaviour
analysis and recommendation.
Most of the existing studies on Twitter spam focus on
account blocking, which is to identify and block spam
users, or spammers. Hu et al. utilized social graph
and the tweets of a user and formulated spammer de-
tection as an optimization problem [12]. Similarly, in-
formation extracted from user’s tweets, demographics,
shared URLs, and social connection are utilized as fea-
tures in standard machine learning algorithms to detect
spam users [13]. However, account blocking approach
is less effective for spammers who may act as legiti-
mate users by posting non-spam content regularly. Block-
ing spammers may even hurt a legitimate user who hap-
pens to grant permission to a third-party application that
posts spammy tweets under her username. This legitimate
account may be blocked because of such spam tweets.
Furthermore, spammers change their tweet content and
strategies to make their tweets and activities look like le-
gitimate [1]. While identifying and blocking spammer
accounts remain a crucial and challenging task, tweet-
level spam detection is essential to fight against spamming
at a more fine-grained level, and helps to timely detect
spam tweets instead of waiting for users to be detected as
spammers. Similarly, Chen et al. suggested that training
dataset should be continuously updated in order to deal
with changing distribution of features in tweet stream [4].
In this paper, we propose a semi-supervised frame-
work for spam tweet detection. The proposed frame-
work mainly consists of two main modules: (i) four light-
weight detectors in the spam tweet detection module for
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detecting spam tweets in real-time, and (ii) updating mod-
ule to periodically update the detection models based on
the confidently labeled tweets from the previous time win-
dow. The detectors are designed based on our observa-
tions made from a collection of 14 million tweets, and
the detectors are computationally effective, suitable for
real-time detection. More importantly, our detectors uti-
lize classification techniques at two levels, tweet-level and
cluster-level. Here, a cluster is a group of tweets with sim-
ilar characteristics. With this flexible design, any features
that may be effective in spam detection can be easily in-
corporated into the detection framework. The framework
starts with a small set of labeled samples, and update the
detection models in a semi-supervised manner by utilizing
the confidently labeled tweets from the previous time win-
dow. This semi-supervised approach helps to learn new
spamming activities, making the framework more robust
in identifying spam tweets.
2 Related Work
Spam is a serious problem on almost all online media
and spam detection has been studied for many years.
Spammers may use different techniques on different plat-
forms so spam detection technique developed for one plat-
form may not be directly applicable on other platforms.
Thomas et al. [19] reported that spam targeting email is
significantly different from spam targeting Twitter. In
Twitter, there are different types of spamming activities
such as link farming [9], spamming trending topics [1],
phishing [5], aggressive posting using social bot [6], to
name a few. These different activities pollute timeline of
users as well as Twitter search results.
Many social spam detection studies focus on the iden-
tification of spam accounts. Lee et al. [13] analyzed
and used features derived from user demographics, fol-
lower/following social graph, tweet content and temporal
aspect of user behavior to identify content polluters. Hu
et al. exploited social graph and tweets of a user to de-
tect spam detection on Twitter. They formulated spam-
mer detection task as an optimization problem [12]. On-
line learning has been utilized to tackle the fast evolving
nature of spammer [11]. They have utilized both content
and network information and incrementally update their
spam detection model for effective social spam detection.
Blacklisted domain
Near-duplicates
Reliable ham tweets
Tweet classification
Tweet stream Labeled tweet stream
Update in batch mode
• Domains, trusted users
spammy words
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• Tweet classifier models
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Figure 1: System Overview of the S3D framework.
Tan et al. [18] proposed an unsupervised spam detection
system that exploits legitimate users in the social network.
Their analysis shows the volatility of spamming patterns
in social network. They have utilized non-spam patterns
of legitimate users based on social graph and user-link
graph to detect spam pattern. Gao et al. [8] identified
social spam by clustering posts based on text and URL
similarities and detecting large clusters with bursty post-
ing patterns.
Removing spam users cannot filter every spam message
as spammer may create another account and restart spam-
ming activity. This calls for tweet-level spam detection.
Inspired from content-based techniques for emails, [15]
utilized standard classifiers to detect spam tweets. Lan-
guage modeling approach has been used to compute the
divergence of trending topic, suspicious message, and ti-
tle of the page linked in the tweet [14]. Similarly, Castillo
et al. [3] analyzed the credibility of tweets on trending
topics based on users’ tweeting and retweeting behaviors,
tweet content and link present in the tweets. As spam-
mers keep on evolving over time, hence semi-supervised
approach is suitable for tracking such changing spamming
activities. Semi-supervised spam detection approach has
been utilized to identify spam on voice-over-IP call [21].
Similarly, a semi-supervised approach is reported to have
better performance than supervised approach for malware
detection task [16]. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge semi-supervised approach has not be utilized to de-
tect spam tweets. Our proposed method is capable of
continuously updating itself by using semi-supervised ap-
proach.
2
3 Semi-supervised Spam Detection
The proposed S3D contains two main modules as shown
in Figure 1. Assuming that we have all the information
(e.g., a blacklist of spamming domains, and trained classi-
fication models), the tweets are labeled as spam and non-
spam (also known as “ham”) tweets using the four de-
tectors in real-time. The required information is updated
periodically based on the confidently labeled tweets from
the previous time window, in a semi-supervised manner.
Next, we detail the main modules.
3.1 Spam Tweet Detection in Real-Time
For efficiency reason, the tweets are labeled by four light-
weight detectors from four perspectives, in an order of the
easiest to hardest in terms of difficulty in detection. Once
a label is assigned by one of the detectors, the tweet need
not pass to the next detector.
Blacklisted Domain Detector. Spammers promote their
services/products by posting links in their tweets [8]. An
effective way of spam detection is to detect tweets con-
taining links from blacklisted domains. The list of black-
listed domains is to be updated at the end of each time
window utilizing confidently labeled tweets, during batch
update.
Near-Duplicate Detector. Tweets that are near-
duplicates of pre-labeled spam/ham tweets are assigned
the same labels accordingly. The near-duplicate tweets
are detected by using the MinHash algorithm [2], which
has shown effectiveness for labeling spam tweets [17].
More specifically, a signature is computed for each tweet
by concatenating the three minimum hash values com-
puted from the tweet’s uni-gram, bi-gram, and tri-gram
representations, respectively. If two or more tweets have
the same signature, then the tweets are considered near-
duplicates. If a cluster of near-duplicate tweets hashed
to the same signature has been labeled as spam or ham
tweets, the new tweet having the same signature receives
the same label.
Reliable Ham Tweet Detector. Tweets posted by le-
gitimate users can be considered as ham tweets, how-
ever; spammers may pretend as legitimate users and af-
ter gaining acceptance from other users they post spam
tweets [22]. Hence, we consider a tweet to be a reli-
able ham tweet if it satisfies two conditions: (i) the tweet
does not contain any spammy words, and (ii) the tweet is
posted by a trusted user.
Spammy words are that words whose probability of oc-
currence is larger in spam than in ham tweets. For exam-
ple, word followme is likely to appear in spam tweets but
the word may appear in ham tweet as well. Specifically,
let ps(w) be the probability of word w appearing in the
spam tweets, and ph(w) be the probability of w in ham
tweets. Then w is a spammy word if ps(w) > ph(w). In
our implementation, words that are shorter than 3 charac-
ters in length are ignored.
A trusted user is a user who has never posted any spam
tweet and has posted as least 5 confident ham tweets. A
tweet is a confident ham tweet if the tweet does not con-
tain any spammy words and is predicted to be ham by all
the component classifiers in the tweet classification detec-
tor. The clusters of near-duplicate tweets will also be pre-
dicted as “clusters of spam” or “clusters of ham” by mul-
tiple classifiers. The tweets in a cluster which is predicted
to be ham cluster by all classifiers are also considered as
confident ham tweets.
During the batch update, the list of trusted users and the
list of spammy words are updated.
Multi-classifier based Detector. Tweets that are not la-
beled in any of the previous steps are processed and la-
beled in this step. Here, we develop a spam detector by us-
ing three efficient classifiers, namely Naı¨ve Bayes (NB),
Logistic Regression (LR), and Random Forest (RF). The
three classifiers use different classification techniques,
i.e., generative, discriminative, and decision tree-based
classification models. A full spectrum of features is ex-
tracted to represent each tweet. Listed in Table 3 in the
column titled “Features for tweet representation”, the fea-
tures include hashtag-based features, content-based fea-
tures, user-based features, and domain-based features.
Most features are self-explanatory and we only elaborate
two features, categorical hashtag, and top domains. Cat-
egorical words are the words used in one of the top-level
categories in Yahoo! hierarchy, or words used to catego-
rize content in four Web sites: BBC, CNN, NYTimes and
Reddit. There are 75 categories including sports, technol-
ogy, business, movie, jobs etc. The binary feature is 1 if
the hashtag is one of the categorical words. The domain
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feature is based on the domain of the URLs contained in
tweets. Domain ranking is from alexa.com. A tweet is
labeled as spam if at least two of the three classifiers pre-
dict the tweet to be spam; otherwise the tweet is labeled
as ham.
3.2 Model Update in Batch Mode
The time window for the update is set to be one day in
our experiments. The key desideratum is to identify the
confidently labeled data of the previous time window.
Confidently Labeled Tweets. Tweets that are labeled
by the first three detectors (i.e., blacklisted domain, near-
duplicate, and reliable ham tweet) are considered as con-
fidently labeled tweets. For the classifier based detector,
recall that we use three classifiers each is based on a dif-
ferent classification technique. Tweets that are labeled as
spam by all the three classifiers are considered as confi-
dently labeled spam tweets. Similarly, tweets that do not
contain any spammy words and are labeled as ham by all
the three classifiers are confidently labeled ham tweets.
Excluding ham tweets containing spammy words (e.g.,
followme) helps to prevent the deviation of classifier from
a burst of spammy words in ham tweets.
The identified confidently labeled spam tweets are uti-
lized to update blacklist domains, and confidently labeled
ham tweets are utilized to identify trusted users.
Near-duplicate Cluster Labeling. Recall that the near-
duplicate detector computes a signature for each tweet to
check if the tweet is a near-duplicate of a labeled cluster.
If the signature of a tweet does not match any pre-labeled
cluster, then the tweet is passed to the next level detectors.
After each time window, all the tweets that do not
match pre-labeled clusters but having the same signature
are grouped into a new cluster; i.e., each cluster is a col-
lection of near-duplicate tweets. Next, we label the clus-
ters each containing at least 10 tweets and if the labels are
of high confidence, then the signatures of these newly la-
beled confident clusters will be used by the near-duplicate
detector in the next time window. Recall that all the tweets
have been labeled as spam and ham tweets (see Figure 1),
an easy approach to label these clusters is to perform a
majority voting. Specifically, if there are more spams in
a cluster than ham tweets, then the cluster is labeled as
a spam cluster. However, the majority voting approach
solely relies on the predicting power of the detectors and
may not capture the new spamming patterns in the most
recent time window. Moreover, because tweets in a clus-
ter are near-duplicates, their labels assigned by the detec-
tors are mostly the same. For this reason, we also employ
a feature-based classifier.
Each cluster is represented with hashtag-based features,
content-based features, user-based features, and domain-
based features, as listed in Table 3, the third column.
Many of the features used here are adopted from existing
studies [3,7]. Different from tweet classification (features
listed in the second column), the cluster-level features
represent the collective information obtained from all the
tweets in the cluster. The clusters represented in feature-
space are classified using a logistic regression classifier.
We consider a cluster to be a confidently labeled cluster
if the labels predicted by the feature-based cluster clas-
sifier and the majority voting of the tweet labels are the
same.
Update Detector Models. After finding the confidently
labeled tweets and clusters, the models used by the de-
tectors are updated accordingly including blacklisted do-
mains, labeled clusters, trusted users and tweet classifi-
cation models. Blacklisted domains are updated by in-
cluding domains having at least 5 tweets in the last time
window and at least 90% of the tweets are confidently la-
beled as spam tweets. A user having at least 5 tweets and
all tweets are confidently labeled ham tweets is consid-
ered as a trusted user. The classification models of the
three classifiers are retrained by including the newly la-
beled confident tweets of the last time window.
By updating the detection models in batch mode, the
proposed semi-supervised spam detection framework is
capable of capturing new vocabulary and new spamming
behaviours, which makes the framework robust and adap-
tive to deal with the dynamic nature of spamming activi-
ties.
3.3 Computational Efficiency
All the four spam detectors are computational effective,
hence the proposed framework is capable of labeling
tweet stream in real-time. We conduct experiments on
a desktop PC with octa-core Intel processor of 3.70GHz
and 16 GB RAM. In our experiments, all the detectors
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are carried out on a single-core of the processor, except
random forest classifier which utilizes all the cores of the
processor. Empirically, we found that on average it takes
0.495 ms to label a tweet where more than 50% of the
time is used for feature extraction. Note that, our code is
not optimized for real-time setting, and efficiency can be
further improved by parallelising the detectors.
4 Experiment and Discussion
We used 15 days of data from HSpam14 dataset [17] in
our experiments. HSpam14 contains 14 million tweets,
collected by using the trending topics on Hashtags.org for
two months, May and June 2013. In this research, we use
15 days of tweets (May 17 - 31, 2013) where each day
has more than 35 thousand tweets. The time window for
batch mode update is set to be a day. Almost all tweets in
HSpam14 are labeled to be spam and ham and the remain-
ing small portion are labeled as unknown for not being
able to determine their labels even with manual inspec-
tion. Note that, more than 80% of tweets in HSpam14 are
labeled automatically and the manually labeled tweets are
biased to spams.
We simulate a tweet stream in our experiments. On
the first day, the detectors in S3D are trained by using the
manually labeled tweets and the reliable ham tweets in the
HSpam14 dataset (the released HSpam14 dataset contains
the detailed labels of the tweets, i.e., on which step a tweet
was labeled during dataset construction). These training
tweets are utilized to create the initial set of blacklisted
domains, labeled clusters, trusted users, labeled tweets
and spammy words. There are 48849 spam tweets and
22185 ham tweets. The remaining tweets on the first day
and all the tweets of the remaining 14 days are used for
testing purpose. Because not all tweets in HSpam14 are
manually labeled, to ensure the accuracy of the evaluation
in our experiments, we manually label 300 randomly se-
lected tweets from each time window to evaluate the per-
formance of the system.1 The performance is evaluated
using the commonly used metric: Precision, Recall, and
F1.
Supervised spammer detection on Twitter such as [7,
13] focus on spammer detection whereas our work is on
1We have also evaluated the results using the manually labeled tweets in the
HSpam14, similar results were obtained.
Table 1: Fraction of tweets detected by each detector
Step Detector Coverage
1 Blacklisted domain detection 5.55%
2 Near-duplicates detection 6.61%
3 Reliable ham tweets 0.64%
4 Tweet classification 87.20%
tweet-level spam detection. Hence, these spammer de-
tection systems can not be compared with our proposed
method. Previous tweet-level spam detection studies used
off-the-shelf classifiers namely, Naı¨ve Bayes, Logistic
Regression and Random Forest classifier, in supervised
settings. We have also used these methods to compare
the performance with that of our proposed system. More
specifically, tweet classification using logistic regression
reported in this paper is similar to the work on informa-
tion credibility [3] and also similar to the method reported
in [14]. Most of the features described in the information
credibility paper except propagation related features are
used in the S3D as well. Propagation related features are
not available in HSpam14 dataset so those features could
not be used. Similarly, Naı¨ve Bayes and Random Forest
classifiers are used in [14,15,20] for tweet-level spam de-
tection. Random Forest classifier is found to be superior
among all the other methods [15,20]. In our experiments,
we compare the results of S3D with the classification re-
sults of using these classifiers in supervised setting.
4.1 Result and Discussion
S3D has four detectors as shown in Figure 1. Table 1 re-
ports the percentage of tweets labeled by each detector. It
shows that 5.55% of the tweets are labeled by the black-
listed domain detector and 6.61% of the tweets are labeled
by the near-duplicate detector. Reliable ham tweet detec-
tor has very low coverage of 0.64%. The low coverage
is due to the fact that the HSpam14 dataset was collected
based on popular hashtags, not on user basis [17]. In other
words, the dataset does not contain all tweets of any user.
Because a trusted user should have at least 5 ham tweets,
only a small set of users can be identified as trusted users.
Remaining 87.20% of tweets are labeled by the last detec-
tor, tweet classifier. Next, we report the spam detection
performance of S3D with more focus on the tweet classi-
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Figure 2: Comparison of supervised and semi-supervised approach
fier detector.
We now report the performance of the following five
methods for the spam tweet detection task.
• Naı¨ve Bayes (NB): This method reports the predic-
tion results of the Naı¨ve Bayes classifier rely on the
training data of the first day.
• Logistic Regression (LR): This method reports the
prediction results of the Logistic Regression classi-
fier rely on the training data of the first day.
• Random Forest (RF): This method reports the pre-
diction results of the Random Forest classifier rely
on the training data of the first day.
• S3D-Update: The results of the S3D framework
without batch update. That is, the detectors in the
framework fully rely on the training data of the first
day, the same as the three classifiers above.
• S3D: The results of the proposed S3D framework,
with model update after each time window.
Figure 2 plots the Precision, Recall and F1 scores of the
five methods. Observe S3D achieves the best F1 scores.
The significant better F1 scores against S3D-Update over
all days shows that semi-supervised approach is suitable
for real-time spam detection in Twitter as it learns new
spamming patterns continuously. Comparing S3D with
the F1 scores of NB, LR and RF shows that proposed
method is superior to standard supervised methods. Ob-
serve F1 scores of S3D is consistent over time compare
to other methods. It is observed that precision of RF is
best for 3 days but recall is the lowest of all. In contrast,
Table 2: Top-15 most effective vocabulary features
Tweet follow; follow back; back; ipad ipadgames;
please follow; please; followers; retweet; tf-
bjp; teamfollowback; ipad; follow me; col-
lected; followback; gameinsight
Cluster follow; love; back; followers; follow me; fol-
low back; retweet; openfollow; teamfollow-
back; want; someone; win; please; 500aday;
gain
NB has good recall at the expense of lower precision. The
results show that proposed S3D method is effective to cap-
ture spam tweets effectively.
The sudden rise of the F1 scores on the 12th day is
due to a large number of relatively easy to detect spam
tweets in that day. In HSpam14 dataset, the tweets were
collected by using trending keywords of each day which
leads to change in the distribution of words of each day.
The significant fluctuation of performance of S3D may be
due to the changing distribution of dataset in each time
window. However, as S3D continuously learns new pat-
terns and vocabulary, its performance is found to be more
consistent compare to other methods. More specifically,
Figure 3(a) plots the number of blacklisted domains, con-
fidently labeled near-duplicate clusters and trusted users.
It shows that S3D keeps on utilizing new knowledge ob-
tained from earlier labeled tweets and clusters to improve
the capability of spam tweets detection. Furthermore, we
have also used top 10,000 frequent uni-/bi- and tri-grams
computed at the end of each time window to update the
model to deal with vocabulary change (see Table 3).
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Figure 3: Accumulated numbers of blacklisted domains,
confident clusters and trusted users, and precision of con-
fidently labeled clusters/tweets
In S3D, we identify the confidently labeled tweets and
the confidently labeled near-duplicate clusters. The con-
fidently labeled tweets and clusters are utilized to learn
new models for the detectors. The quality of these confi-
dently labeled tweets and clusters are therefore crucial for
the performance of S3D. Here, we evaluate the quality of
these tweets and clusters, plotted in Figure 3(b). The con-
fident clusters are evaluated by manually labeled 47 ran-
domly selected clusters on each day, which is the smallest
number of confidently labeled clusters produced over the
15 days. Figure 3(b) shows that the precision of confident
clusters is almost perfect for both spam and ham clusters.
The figure also shows that the precision of confidently la-
beled spam and ham tweets are consistently above 95%.
Adding such clusters and tweets in the training process
makes S3D capable of capturing emerging spamming ac-
tivities as well as new vocabulary.
4.2 Feature Analysis
There are four types of features used to represent tweet
and cluster for classification (see Table 3). In our exper-
iments, we observe that normalization of features gives
better performance than without normalization. Because
users’ followers, followees and total tweets exhibit power
law distributions. The features derived from these val-
ues are normalized based on percentile. Features such as
length of a tweet in characters and words show normal
distribution which are normalized by the maximum value.
Based on the Gini impurity score, we identify the top-15
most effective features for tweet classification and cluster
classification respectively. These features are highlighted
in Table 3 in “(x)” format, where x is the top ranking po-
sition.
It is observed that 10 out of the top-15 most effective
features are vocabulary-based features for tweet classifi-
cation whereas in the case of cluster classification only 3
out of the top-15 features are vocabulary-based features.
Meta-data of a tweet contains information only about the
single tweet which is comparatively less informative. In
contrast, a cluster contains a number of tweets, hence
meta-data based features represent the collective informa-
tion of tweets in the cluster and are comparatively more
informative. For example, if there is a tweet from a user
whose account creation date is known and has very few
followers and followees, it is hard to determine that tweet
posted by this users is ham or spam. In contrast, if there
is a group of users whose accounts are created around the
same time and all having very few number of followers
and followees, and posting near-duplicate tweets, then the
tweets in this cluster are likely to be spam.
Table 2 lists the top-15 vocabulary-based features (uni-
gram, bi-gram and tri-gram). Only uni-gram and bi-gram
vocabulary appear in the top ranked list. One possible
reason for tri-gram features not in the list may be due to
the sparsity of the tri-gram vocabulary in the dataset. It
is interesting to note that most of the top words based on
Gini-impurity score are the same as the list of hashtags
having the highest spammy-index reported in [17].
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Table 3: Features used to represent tweets and clusters for classification; FoT means Fraction of Tweets and FoU
means Fraction of Users. The top-15 most effective features for tweet classification and cluster classification based
on the Gini impurity score are indicated by the numbers (x) following the features (1 ≤ x ≤ 15).
Type Features for tweet representation Features for cluster representation
Hashtag Contains hashtag FoT having hashtag (3)
Contains more than 2 hashtags (1) FoT having more than 2 hashtags (5)
Contains spammy hashtag (2) Hashtag per tweet (12)
Contains categorical hashtag (7) FoT having spammy hashtag (14)
Contains capitalized hashtag (8) FoT having categorical word as hashtag
FoT having capitalized hashtag (4)
Content Fraction of words that are spammy FoT having spammy words
Contains question mark FoT having question mark
Contains money sign FoT having exclamation mark (10)
Contains exclamation sign (13) FoT having money sign
Contains positive emoticons FoT having positive emoticons (7)
Contains negative emoticons FoT having negative emoticons
Contains positive words FoT having positive words
Contains negative words FoT having negative words (8)
Fraction of uppercase characters (9) Fraction of capitalized tweets (2)
Contains URL (11) FoT that are retweet (6)
Is retweet FoT having URL
Contains mention (14) Mentions per tweet (15)
Contains first person pronoun FoT tweets having first person pronoun
Contains second person pronoun FoT tweets having second person pronoun
Contains third person pronoun FoT tweets having third person pronoun
Normalized length of the tweet in word Median tweet length in word/(max tweet length)
Normalized length of the tweet in character (10) Median tweet length in characters /140
Contains top 10,000 uni-/bi-/tri-gram of last time window Contains top 10,000 uni-/bi-/tri-gram of the last time window
Day of the week in which the tweet is posted Ratio of spam tweets in the cluster (1)
User Has less than 5 percentile followers (3) FoU having less then 5 percentile followers
Has less than 5 percentile followees (6) FoU having less then 5 percentile followees
Has more than 50 percentile total tweets FoU having more than 50 percentile total tweets
Percentile followers of the user (15) Median percentile of followers of users
Percentile followees of the user Median percentile of followees of users
Percentile total tweet count of the user Median percentile of total tweets of the users (11)
User profile contains description (5) FoU having description in profile
User profile description contains spammy words FoU having spammy words in description
User profile has url FoU having URL in profile
User profile has location info FoU having location info in profile
User profile has time-zone info FoU having timezone info in profile
Followers-followees ratio (4) FoU having followers greater than followee
User’s normalized age (12) Median normalized age of users
Fraction of post by the dominating user (9)
Percentile followers of the user tweeting the most
Percentile followees of the user tweeting the most
Percentile total tweets of the user tweeting the most
Tweets per user
Standard deviation of normalized age of users (13)
Percentile followers of the most followed user
Percentile followees of the most followed user
Percentile total tweets of the most followed user
Domain URL from top 100 domains FoT having URL from top 100 domains
URL from top 1000 domains FoT having URL from top 1000 domains
URL from top 10000 domains FoT having URL from top 10000 domains
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a semi-supervised spam de-
tection framework, named S3D. S3D utilizes four light-
weight detectors to detect spam tweets on real-time basis
and update the models periodically in batch mode. The
experiment results demonstrate the effectiveness of semi-
supervised approach in our spam detection framework. In
our experiment, we found that confidently labeled clus-
ters and tweets make the system effective in capturing
new spamming patterns. Due to the limited user infor-
mation in the dataset, we have used the simple technique
to deal with user-level spam detection. However, we ar-
gue that the user-level spam detection can be incorporated
into S3D, which is part of our future work.
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